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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and daughter Kim Ju-ae watch the nighttime military parade in Pyongyang’s Kim Il-sung Square held for the 75th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army on Feb. 8 hand in hand with his daughter Kim Ju-ae. (KCNA/Yonhap)

The US is responsible for the hype surrounding Kim Ju-ae, the “respected daughter” of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, as she is a star born from the US’ “tailored deterrence” strategy. This may sound odd at first glance, so let’s go through everything one by one.

The fundamental goal of the South Korea-US military alliance is deterrence and victory. The primary goal is to show off the formidable destructive power of their military to make North Korea fear war. It is a threat to North Korea: If you ever think about starting a war, you’ll come out of it worse than when you started. If North Korea ignores that warning and starts a war, this military will be forced to mobilize, and it will come out victorious.

The key to victory in this case is the US’ nuclear weapons. The key to deterrence here is the threat that, if North Korea attacks the US with nuclear weapons, the US will retaliate with nuclear weapons that are even stronger than those of North Korea.

The spread of that deterrence to the Korean Peninsula is what counts as “extended deterrence.” The US has expanded the scope of deterrence to prevent North Korea from attacking South Korea by threatening to use nuclear weapons if necessary.

Then what should we do to threaten North Korea so much that they do not even dare to attack? The South Korea-US alliance has come up with one answer: tailored deterrence. It aims to focus its nuclear and military capabilities on where they will hurt North Korea the most. So, ending the North Korean regime has become the goal of tailored deterrence.

Since keeping its regime safe is at the top of North Korea’s priorities, threatening the end of that regime is hitting North Korea’s weak spot. This explains why the US’ Nuclear Posture Review publicly talked about the “end” of the North Korea regime. One can say that this can be evaluated as a nuclear strategy with logical consistency.

But such logic will not bring peace and stability. Why? Because tailored deterrence is a one-sided logic, while international relations must be mutual. South Korea and the US are using tailored deterrence to ensure their own safety, but for this strategy to work, North Korea must fear the US’ nuclear weapons.

An essential condition for tailored deterrence is North Korea’s fear. The security of South Korea and the US requires the anxiety of North Korea. However, a country that is constantly forced to be anxious will have no choice but to retaliate. This is why North Korea is modernizing its military and strengthening its nuclear weapons.

At this point, North Korea’s security becomes a source of anxiety for South Korea and the US. American international relations scholar John H. Herz called this reciprocal situation, in which the security of one country becomes the source of anxiety for another, the security dilemma. “All we want to do is make sure that our country is secure, so why are you making us nervous?” Fingers are pointed at each other. “We want to ensure peace, but you’re being too belligerent!” It becomes hard to foresee the end of an arms race when one is trapped within the confines of this dilemma without recognizing it as a problem. Such is the current situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Now the floundering in the Korean Peninsula is approaching a dangerous line. Both parties are crossing the temporary military demarcation line that was drawn during the war, and “the threat of deterrence,” and “anxieties over security” are being frequently exchanged. The level is continuing to rise.

As if a three-axis defense system is not enough, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is pursuing a four-axis system and is even talking about going further to promote a “plus alpha” system.

They are saying that the three axes of “preemptive strikes,” destroying North Korean missiles in the air before they strike their targets, and raining attacks on North Korea in retaliation in order to bring an end to the regime, is not enough. They are looking for a fourth axis, one which will disable North Korea’s missile launches before they even happen.

Since the North Korean nuclear weapons issue is a regime issue, the People Power Party’s special committee on North Korean issues claims that “decapitation strikes” are not enough, and only the democratization of North Korea is the fundamental solution.

The Kim Jong-un regime is also responding strongly. It is showing off its weapons systems, which can strike any place in South Korea, and is also flaunting missiles and warheads that could neutralize South Korea’s defense missiles. It is improving maneuverability and stealth technologies as well as shortening the preparation time for missile launches to preemptively act in response to South Korea’s “preemptive” attacks.

As if this is not enough to satiate its anxiety, it is enabling tactical nuclear weapons to strike South Korea and introduced its “tactical nuclear weapons operations units” at a military parade on Feb. 9. A law has been enacted that states that nuclear weapons can be used when a nuclear attack or an attack by another weapon of mass destruction has been carried out or is judged to be imminent.

These examples make it seem as if the two Koreas are on the same playing field, but this is an unfair comparison. The US State Department assessed that in 2019, North Korea spent US$4.3 billion on defense, compared to the US$44 billion that South Korea spent. When it comes to defense costs, South Korea spends at least 10 times more than North Korea.

In addition, the State Department estimates that North Korea’s gross domestic product is US$16.2 billion. In other words, it is impossible for North Korea to keep up with South Korea’s defense spending, even if it concentrates 100% of its economic activities on the military. In addition, South Korea not only is an ally of the US, but is also strengthening military cooperation with Japan, which is seeking the ability to attack enemy bases.

In particular, the US is constantly trying to threaten North Korea by mobilizing both non-nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons to realize “tailored deterrence.” If one starts to hint that the US' “extended deterrence” is not trustworthy, like how the Yoon administration is behaving now, the US feels the pressure to strengthen its threats to North Korea. This is why US military activities have become livelier during the last few years.

Operational plans have been updated so that nuclear weapons can actually be used, nuclear weapons have been flaunted from time to time in South Korea and surrounding countries, and military exercises have been conducted both with South Korea or in coalition with South Korea and Japan.

The Biden administration is showing off the fact that it could, at any time, finish the Kim Jong-un regime, and is also demonstrating its willingness to do so.

But the US’ deterrence is North Korea’s anxiety. Strengthening deterrence will lead to an escalation of anxiety. North Korea is responding more strongly. It has adopted a new doctrine on nuclear weapons use created with the intention of “making hostile forces have a clear understanding [of] the fact that the military confrontation with the DPRK brings about ruin.”

It stipulates that nuclear weapons can be used if “an attack by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction was launched or drew near.” Even “monster” nuclear missiles that could target any place in the US are not enough, so North Korea unveiled its intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with solid fuel at a military parade and presented its “strategic missile unit.” This shows off its ability and willingness to “wipe away all evil and unjust forces on this planet.”

Kim Ju-ae is one of North Korea’s counterstrategies. Since the South Korea-US alliance is seeking the end of the Kim Jong-un regime, North Korea will do its best to protect Kim Jong-un, but, in case of an emergency, it will have to fight to keep the “Paektu bloodline” in power.

At the military parade of the People’s Army held on Feb. 8, soldiers shouted slogans such as “Defend Kim Jong-un to the death!” “Defend the Paektu bloodline to the death!” “Unification of the Motherland!” This is North Korea’s response to the tailored deterrence strategy.

By Suh Jae-jung, professor of political science and international relations at the International Christian University in Tokyo

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