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US President Joe Biden toasts Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan during the state dinner for the latter at the White House on April 10, 2024. (AFP/Yonhap)

By Lee Bon-young, Washington correspondent

US President Dwight Eisenhower, who signed the new Japan-US Security Treaty in 1961, called Japan the “biggest aircraft carrier in the Pacific.” These words succinctly sum up America’s perception of Japan’s strategic value. In other words, Japan may be nothing more than a logistics base for the US. 

When meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida last week, US President Joe Biden declared recent agreements to be the “most significant upgrade” to the alliance between their two countries. The US and Japan agreed to improve their combined operational capabilities by streamlining their command-and-control systems and to jointly develop weapons.

The US also promised support to further develop Japan’s counterstrike capabilities. The US-Japan alliance continues to expand, particularly with the South China Sea, East China Sea and Taiwan in mind. It could even be seen as opening up the possibility for the relationship with Japan to develop into a military alliance of equals. 

But Japan’s status as a junior partner in the alliance is unlikely to change any time soon. Kishida said that Japan “will always stand firm with the United States.” It sounded like he was trying to reassure Washington that, even if the obstacles that have limited Japan’s military development were removed, Tokyo would not change its behavior in any dramatic way that may upset its ally.

But what matters is the direction that the alliance is headed. If we look at the current changing trends in the US-Japan alliance, the shadow of the UK-Japan alliance of 120 years ago still lingers. At that time, the UK and Japan joined forces to stop Russia’s southward advance. Similarly, now the US and Japan have come together in an even stronger way to contain China. 

As was the case with the UK then, the US is no longer at its peak of power and it’s difficult for Washington to deal with its strategic rivals alone. Like with the UK in the past, the US too is now facing resistance at home to excessive military spending. 

This summit also underscored that in the realm of military alliances, Japan stands as the US’ foremost partner, with South Korea and the Philippines ranking below Tokyo. South Korea and Japan have different levels of economic interdependence with China, and there are also differences in their national power and capabilities. Therefore, this hierarchical order is natural to some extent.

The question is how this structure will impact Korea’s interests and fate in the future. At the end of the Joseon dynasty, the US, UK and Japan hatched a plot to divide their interests in East Asia, such as by recognizing Korea and the Philippines as Japanese and American areas of control, respectively, through the Taft–Katsura agreement and the first and second Anglo-Japanese alliances.

But Korea and the Philippines are no longer prey now. The two countries are US allies and are tied to Japan in a US-led security cooperation relationship aimed at containing China. 

However, Japan’s role as the senior partner in the US-centered alliance system appears to be irreversible. The US, Japan and the Philippines, which held their first trilateral summit the day after the US-Japan summit, held their first joint military drills last year.

There are also reports that a special security unit of Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force will offer capacity-building support to coast guards in South Pacific islands. There is a high possibility that the expansion of Japan’s military role and status could eventually lead to another “upgrade” of the US-Japan alliance.

There is also another similarity with the joint cooperation of the past. The Taft-Katsura pact, concluded in July 1905, a month before the signing of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance, also stipulated that the US, UK, and Japan should form an alliance and coordinate their actions in the Far East.

In line with the US-Japan summit, the British Ministry of Defense announced that joint military exercises among the US, UK and Japan will become a regular occurrence starting next year.

But what do these repeating patterns mean? In South Korea, there is a considerable force centered around the current government that is enthusiastic about strengthening military cooperation with Japan. It's uncertain whether they have considered the possibility that short-term security enhancement could sow the seeds of long-term security instability.

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]