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Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, commander of United States Forces Korea, speaks at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in Washington, DC, on April 21, 2026. (via USFK)

In an appearance before the US Senate Armed Services Committee last month, the commander of United States Forces Korea (USFK) stressed that the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to Korea “must be conditions-based” and the necessity of ensuring “political expediency does not outpace the conditions.” 

At first glance, Gen. Xavier Brunson’s view sounds persuasive, as it appears reasonable to exclude shallow political calculations when making decisions on matters of national defense. However, upon closer examination, Brunson’s remarks do not align with the principle of civilian control of the military and are out of touch with reality in the context of historical discussions on OPCON transfer between Korea and the US.

The right to command Korea’s armed forces has been held by the United Nations Command and ROK-US Combined Forces Command — two organizations that have exclusively been run by US Army generals — ever since President Syngman Rhee transferred operational control of the ROK Army to Gen. Douglas MacArthur on July 14, 1950, shortly after the Korean War broke out. 

The return of wartime operational control to Seoul represents a change in the military command structure of the South Korea-US alliance. 

In both the US and Korea, presidents serve as the commander-in-chief of the nation’s armed forces. Accordingly, OPCON transfer falls within the realm of political decisions made by each head of state. This is rooted in the military and political science principle of civilian control that grants the state’s right to make decisions on military and national defense policies to civilians — that is, politicians — rather than professional soldiers.

In a House Armed Services Committee hearing on April 22, Brunson initially proposed the first quarter of 2029 as the date for OPCON transfer. Korea’s Ministry of National Defense has not shied away from expressing distaste toward this timeframe. 

US Forces Korea and Korean troops carry out a joint river-crossing exercise in Yeoju, Gyeonggi Province, on Oct. 19, 2022. (via ROK Army Facebook page)

“Commander Brunson’s remarks represent the views of the USFK, and the timeframe for OPCON transfer will be decided upon by the defense ministers of both nations at the Security Consultative Meeting, based on the opinions of Korea and US military authorities, and recommended to the presidents of both countries,” ministry spokesperson Jung Bit-na stated in a regular briefing on April 23. 

This statement paints the timeframe as an issue to be dealt with via political decision by the heads of state, several rungs senior to Brunson’s position as a US Army general. The commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command is the direct superior of the USFK commander.

The “conditions-based” transfer that Brunson has emphasized is also not set in stone. In fact, the US position on OPCON transfer has continued to shift over time based on the state of international affairs and its own political expediency.

The framework of a conditions-based OPCON transfer has been in place since Korea and the US reached an agreement in October 2014, during the Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama administrations. The three conditions that must be fulfilled are Korea having the military capabilities to lead a combined defense, the alliance’s comprehensive ability to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and a security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region conducive to stable OPCON transfer.

In contrast, the method pursued during the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak administrations followed a timeline-based approach rather than a condition-based one, setting a target date for OPCON transfer. 

In February 2007, the Roh Moo-hyun and George W. Bush administrations agreed during a defense ministers’ meeting to transfer wartime OPCON on April 17, 2012. A year earlier, in 2006, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had stated he “trusted the capabilities of the ROK Army” during negotiations over OPCON transfer, and expressed an intention to transfer control to Seoul in October 2009. 

The Korean government had set 2012 as the target date for reasons such as securing the necessary forces for the transfer, but the US proposal was nearly three years ahead of this timeframe. From this point on, the issue of OPCON transfer remained in a deadlock, with the US wishing to implement the transfer as soon as possible and Korea claiming preparations were not yet finished. 

President Lee Jae Myung carries out an inspection of the guard at an event commemorating Armed Forces Day on Oct. 7, 2025. (via Blue House)

This was at the height of the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the US wanted more flexibility for the standing forces on the Korean Peninsula, and sought to promptly return wartime OPCON to Korea as a way to get out of its burden of defending the Korean Peninsula.

Since switching to a conditions-based framework for OPCON transfer, the US has been more focused on “meeting the conditions” and shifted toward dragging its feet on implementation. As the US increasingly prioritizes checking China and implementing a strategy of containment against it, this is motivated by the belief that retaining wartime OPCON over Korean forces gives it a military advantage in the China-adjacent Korean Peninsula.

Part of why peacetime operational control was returned to Korea in December 1994 was the need to cut back on US forces overseas after the end of the Cold War and the rise of anti-American sentiment in Korea after the 1980 massacre in Gwangju. The US, which held wartime OPCON of the Korean military, is said to have agreed to the deployment of units to Gwangju in May 1980. This subsequently set off a wave of anti-Americanism in Korea over whether the US bore partial responsibility for the atrocity. 

Fearing entanglement in Korea’s domestic affairs, Washington reportedly was the one to offer Seoul peacetime OPCON. 

The US decision in 1968 to grant South Korea the authority to conduct counter-infiltration operations against North Korean spies was also made out of political expediency. 

On Jan. 21, 1968, North Korean special forces attempted to raid the presidential office in Seoul, and two days later, Pyongyang seized the American intelligence ship USS Pueblo. At the time, the US took no action on the raid but issued DEFCON 2 — one step short of war — in response to the Pueblo incident. 

Enraged by this, then-President Park Chung-hee demanded the return of wartime OPCON from the US. In a bilateral summit on April 17, 1968, both sides compromised to allow South Korea control over counterespionage operations, including reservists.

Brunson stressed that political expediency cannot “outpace conditions,” but based on decades of bilateral talks on OPCON, the approach has varied depending on the circumstances at a given time. 

By Kwon Hyuk-chul, staff reporter

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]