Limited deal to reopen Hormuz is most realistic path forward for US and Iran, says expert

Limited deal to reopen Hormuz is most realistic path forward for US and Iran, says expert

Posted on : 2026-04-30 17:20 KST Modified on : 2026-04-30 17:20 KST
Richard Nephew, a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, said that Iran can endure longer than the US may expect
An IRGC speedboat approaches the cargo ship Epaminondas in the Strait of Hormuz, on April 21, 2026. (AP/Yonhap)
An IRGC speedboat approaches the cargo ship Epaminondas in the Strait of Hormuz, on April 21, 2026. (AP/Yonhap)

As the US confronts the limits of its pressure campaign against Iran, an area expert has advised not rushing to ease sanctions on Iran or ink a comprehensive nuclear deal.

Richard Nephew, a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, said in a virtual interview with the Hankyoreh on Tuesday that, for now, the most practical solution for the US is reaching a limited deal focused on opening the Strait of Hormuz — a deal that seeks to manage the situation rather than to reach a permanent solution.

Nephew handled sanctions in nuclear talks with Iran during the Obama administration and helped negotiate the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. He also served as deputy special envoy for Iran under Biden.
 
Easing sanctions would amount to financial relief for the IRGC

At the current moment, Nephew voiced strong concerns about providing large-scale sanctions relief in exchange for Iranian concessions on its nuclear program. He noted that the Iranian government today is “fundamentally different” from the government in 2015, when the JCPOA was negotiated. At the time, reform-minded figures maintained some degree of influence, which meant the benefits of sanctions relief would be shared by society as a whole.

While the US lifted a large number of economic sanctions as part of that deal, it maintained sanctions specifically targeting Iran’s hard-line Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That had the effect of stimulating economic growth in the private sector, which benefited from the resumption of legal trade, while sapping the strength of the IRGC, which had cornered the market on smuggling and other means of sanctions evasion.

“The people who might have been an alternative faction inside of Iran as part of the political system have either been killed or completely marginalized. So the only people in charge now are the IRGC,” Nephew remarked.

That means that the IRGG is “going to be in control of a deal and the Iranian economy that comes out of it,” he said, warning that the US is “just going to be putting money in the hands of the IRGC.”

Nephew cautioned that large-scale sanctions relief could enable the IRGC to become more oppressive and tighten its grip on the Iranian populace. In effect, it would serve as financial aid, giving the regime more staying power.

“Back in 2015, the Iranian nuclear program was vast. [. . .] We needed to play a lot of sanctions [cards] to get a lot of nuclear relief. Well, the nuclear program isn’t like that anymore. For better or for worse, the military actions have actually reduced the amount of nuclear [assets] that the Iranians have,” Nephew said, arguing that the US does not need to lift as many sanctions as before.
 
Verification key to restricting Iran’s nuclear program

While US President Donald Trump has sought a permanent ban on uranium enrichment because of the powerful symbolism of such an agreement, Nephew dismissed that as unrealistic.

“Let’s say they agree they will never have enrichment — in the year 2172, is this really going to be the big problem?” he asked.

Nephew went on: “You know, a 50-year ban is pretty good. A 40-year ban is pretty good. [. . .] if Trump wants to have 25 years rather than 20 — OK, I guess. But I think when people [. . .] make these demands for ‘forever,’ I don’t think they think about what forever means and how it probably isn’t worth sacrificing the chance of a deal.”

The real challenge, Nephew said, is the difficulty of verifying whatever restrictions are imposed. Since Iran’s nuclear program has already crossed technical thresholds, the maximum “breakout time” — the time it would take to manufacture a nuclear weapon — is two years, regardless of the restrictions.

Therefore, Nephew argued that the restrictions do not matter nearly as much as how they are actually verified.

“It is unclear whether Iran could ever prove that it made good on its commitments, especially given the collapse of international verification and inspections over the last year. Tehran, for example, might secretly keep some of its enriched uranium,” Nephew wrote in his piece for Foreign Affairs.

“Iran could have clandestine material out there. And it makes me very skeptical of trying to do a big deal with the Iranians right now in the current environment. I just don’t know that you could have confidence in that deal,” he told the Hankyoreh. 

Iran enjoys increasing leverage despite pressure on oil industry

For Nephew, the US’ next step should be ending its blockade on Iranian shipping in exchange for Iran opening up the Strait of Hormuz, which is currently strangling the global economy.

Nephew said that Iran is capable of enduring the US’ blockade “longer than what the president thinks,” adding that it’s “simply not true” that Iran’s oil fields are going to explode in three days’ time, as Trump has claimed.

In support of that argument, Nephew mentioned three options available to Iran.

First, Iran is able to keep exporting oil through its smuggling routes.

“There’s plenty of articles indicating that ships are still getting through [which] reduces the pressure on storage. [. . .] Because if some ships are getting through, whatever they’re able to export, that’s oil that’s not piling up inside stores,” he explained.

Iran’s second option is to strategically halt operations at oil fields.

“They can pick a couple of oil fields that they reduce production in and start to shut down. I mean, it’s not good for the oil fields. [. . .] But if the Iranians had to choose between damaging an oil field a little bit and making a massive concession to the United States, I think I know what this government is going to do,” he said.

Iran’s third and final option is to apply more pressure to the global economy by attacking ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Richard Nephew, a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. (courtesy of Nephew)
Richard Nephew, a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. (courtesy of Nephew)

Notably, Nephew predicted that the conflict could, with time, turn to Iran’s advantage.

“The leverage that [the US has] with their blockade is we won’t allow Iran to sell oil. But the Iranian leverage is the world won’t get oil,” the analyst observed, noting that unless the US is “prepared to actually force the Iranians to open the strait [which] might involve ground forces [. . .] the Iranians have all the leverage on this point.”

Nephew noted that the recent surge in oil prices is also enabling Iran to endure longer. He acknowledged that a prolonged blockade on Iran would “do damage to the Iranian economy [but] not as much as it used to because they are able to sell oil at much higher prices.”
“Every barrel they sell now is worth two times as much, maybe even three times as much, as what they were selling in January, so they don’t need to sell as much to keep money flowing into their economy,” he said.

He went on: “The rest of the global economy” — including the US — “is dealing with higher prices on consumers that is going to create a lot of economic pressure on the rest of us.”

The China factor

According to Nephew, China represents another factor making it difficult for the US’s blockade strategy to hit Iran where it hurts. 

While the US continues to speak “rhetorically” about going after Chinese financial institutions, in reality, it’s only going after “teapot refineries,” Nephew said. Washington’s reluctance to directly target Chinese financial institutions can be explained by its fear of “undermining the ceasefire on trade” and other major political and economic issues, he argued. 

“The reality is, if you want to put more pressure on the Iranian economy, you need to target China. The only way you can do that is by targeting Chinese [financial] institutions,” he said. 

“Because we haven’t done that, we’ve not been able to persuade the Chinese to reduce what they are doing. Now, if you were to put pressure on the Chinese in that regard, then you could possibly get more pressure to mount on the Iranians,” he said.

Nephew said that rather than becoming fixated on a maritime blockade that doesn’t provide much leverage, the US should be focused on clearing mines and putting out fires. 

“And then if you still want to get a deal, the actual way you get a deal is with sanctions relief and structuring that kind of arrangement, just like you did with the JCPOA,” he said. “That's actually where your leverage is.”

By Kim Won-chul, Washington correspondent

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

 

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