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President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea shakes hands with President Xi Jinping of China on Nov. 15, 2022, ahead of a bilateral summit on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Bali, Indonesia. (courtesy of the presidential office)

Korea-China relations have reached a critical juncture following China’s presentation of a “Four Noes” policy to the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in Seoul.

Depending on how Seoul responds, there may be more turbulence in store for the two countries’ relationship. Significantly, China’s declaration that it will not cooperate on North Korea issues if South Korea accelerates its pro-US/pro-Japan foreign policy suggests that deteriorating relations with China will also negatively impact work on the North Korean nuclear and missile issue.

The Chinese government took advantage of a May 22 visit to South Korea by Liu Jinsong, the director-general of the Department of Asian Affairs of its Foreign Ministry, to declare to Seoul that meddling with Taiwan or close involvement with the US and Japan’s containment of China are “red lines.”

The first of China’s “Four Noes” amounts to a demand for South Korea not to interfere with China’s core interests. That includes Korea continuing to respect the “one China” principle in regard to the Taiwan issue, which was a fundamental part of the two countries’ establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. China refers to the Taiwan issue, as well as Hong Kong and the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, as “core interests” on which it will neither compromise nor tolerate interference by other countries.

The second of the “Four Noes” expressed opposition to a unilateral pro-US/pro-Japan policy. In short, China was telling Korea not to join a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan and not to get deeply involved with the US and Japan in their containment strategy against China, a strategy that China regards as hostile.

But there seems to be little chance that the Yoon administration will respond favorably to the Xi administration’s policy.

Yoon has spoken frankly about the Taiwan issue. In an interview with Reuters in April, the Korean president said that high tensions in Taiwan had “occurred because of the attempts to change the status quo by force” and that “the Taiwan issue is not simply an issue between China and Taiwan but, like the issue of North Korea, [. . .] is a global issue.”

Yoon has also been picking up the pace on a pro-US/pro-Japan foreign policy as part of his values diplomacy, which prioritizes liberal democracy. Significantly, Yoon plans to hold a meeting with the American and Japanese leaders in the US this summer on the topic of strengthening cooperation on national security.

Yoon has sided with the US and Japan’s strategy of containing China, dispensing with the strategic ambiguity that had been maintained by past Korean governments of both the left and right. He has made veiled jabs at China by bringing up the Indo-Pacific strategy and the universal values of freedom, human rights and the rule of law on several occasions during the Group of Seven summit held in Hiroshima, Japan, and the Korea-Pacific Islands summit, held in Korea.

Under these circumstances, the fourth of China’s “Four Noes” is highly suggestive. China said it would not allow Korea to exercise any initiative in regard to North Korea as long as they are not on good terms.

That declaration seems to go beyond telling Korea not to count on any cooperation from China in inter-Korean relations, including North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. It also differs from China’s standard pronouncements that the US may hold the key to the nuclear issue and Pyongyang-Washington relations, but China guards the door and that if North Korea takes radical action, South Korea would stand to lose the most. Instead, it amounts to a warning that the Yoon administration cannot accomplish anything on Korean Peninsula issues without cooperation from China.

China’s tone here sounds quite different from the claim made by Kim Tae-hyo, the first deputy head of South Korea’s National Security Office, on May 22 that Korea “remains in close communication [with China] on necessary issues, including on a high level.”

China’s assertion that President Xi Jinping won’t be able to visit Korea under the current circumstances also suggests that China won’t make an active effort to improve ties with Korea. Xi’s last visit to Korea was in July 2014, during the presidency of Park Geun-hye.

By Lee Je-hun, senior staff writer

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]