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A Korean howitzer blows up smoke bombs during joint drills with the US at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon, Gyeonggi Province, on Aug. 31, 2022. (Yonhap)

It’s already March. Spring brings many things — weapons and armies among them.

It has been one year since the golden wheat fields that lie under a dazzling blue sky across the Eurasian continent from us were transformed into a battleground. Imperial tanks now plow their way through the mud there as the conflict enters its second spring.

It may be that this demands an equal sacrifice in terms of blood and flesh. Here on the other side of the content, it has been 73 years since a battleground was made of what is considered by some to be the world’s most beautiful landscape.

Now bombers are cutting their way through the yellow dust and fine particles, while aircraft carriers churn our seas. An empire’s strategic assets aren’t given for free.

Of all the times they could happen, why are South Korea-US joint military exercises held in March and August? We might just conclude that they want to stage them once the weather has warmed up a bit and vacation season is over. But it’s hard to shake off another notion — one that is especially nasty and more than a little sad.

Just as human beings are really little more than masses of memories, a country cannot exist without historical memory.

One might have preferred that they would have avoided those two months in particular, if only for the sake of memories: of the spring days when the Korean people collectively rose up against imperial oppression, and the warm summer day when we finally escaped that subjugation. Is it too self-denigrating to sense some sort of design in all of this, the sense of forgetting memories of an old empire and turning our attention squarely toward new ones?

Let us objectively consider why joint military exercises might be necessary. To begin with, we require a certain military readiness posture and training because the Korean Peninsula is faced with the grave situation of political division and a war that is still technically ongoing (under the armistice system).

Of the major belligerents in the Korean War, two of the pairs — the US/China and South Korea/China — have brought an end to the conflict by establishing diplomatic relations. South and North Korea, for their part, have declared a de facto end to the war through several agreements and summits.

All that remains to be resolved is the relationship between Pyongyang and Washington. That relationship is a clearly antagonistic one where an intense war is still underway — at least from North Korea’s standpoint.

Second, the need for joint military exercises by South Korea and the US can be seen as a logical consequence of our having signed a Mutual Defense Treaty and established an allied defense system. Moreover, a hostile relationship between South and North is an “automatic” consequence of the North Korea-US relationship.

The third and perhaps most important basis for viewing the exercises as necessary has to do with the way North Korea is perceived.

If we view the North as a malicious enemy that will never give up its nuclear weapons or its ambitions of achieving a communist reunification of the peninsula by force — as a party that needs to be deterred from going to war by overwhelming military strength, and that should be brought to its knees or even toppled by economic sanctions — then it makes sense entirely to expand and intensify the joint exercises.

Where there is certainly room for rebutting each of these arguments, they still hold powerful sway in practice. The US is the party that takes the most advantage of their power and that continues to feed them to suit its interests.

From the outset, South Korea was itself one of many American “strategic assets.” Words like “blood alliance,” “friend,” and “partner” are part of a dialect that is employed mainly in the South Korean context.

As it wages an endless war on South Korean soil, the US is obliged to maintain constant readiness and continue training its overseas troops.

The exercises are also essential in terms of career opportunities for individual US soldiers. Since their origins in 1954 with the Focus Lens exercise held exclusively by the US (UN Command), the exercises have expanded into a wide range of drills in which the participants include the South Korean military and government and US reinforcements.

Since the Cold War ended, the US has basically had only the Korean Peninsula available as a place to hold large-scale military exercises, apart from its actual combat activities in the Middle East. As a geostrategic asset, our stock has steadily risen.

In addition to boosting its military readiness posture, the exercises are also an occasion for the US military to test new weapons. It has used them to promote weapon sales and instill a US concept of combat operations, which naturally boosts its alliance leadership — which is to say, its partner’s dependence on the US.

At a strategic level above and beyond tactics and operations, the US is also seeking to send a message to its strategic competitors by showing off its regional and global strategy. The joint exercises held on the Korean Peninsula aren’t simply meant as a gesture to North Korea.

The result of all this is that the US has come to direct those exercises to suit its own interests. This is why it will never voluntarily return wartime operational control (OPCON), where the formulation of exercises and operational plans is a key element. It’s also the reason it prefers South Korean administrations that share its perception of the North.

The new name used for the joint exercises last August was Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS). The March exercises, which only involve military drills, are known simply as “FS.” Where the past name of “Freedom Guardian” gave the sense of more of a human focus, the new name carries more of a weapon focus.

It is expected to live up to that name by including a large-scale deployment of US strategic assets. In response to the US’ activities, a Feb. 20 statement by Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong warned of the North’s plans for “using the Pacific as our firing range” and for taking “corresponding counteraction.”

No matter how much we might oppose these joint exercises and the risk of warfare they pose, the exercises appear likely to go on as scheduled — and the risks to rise as predicted. If it has to be this way, shouldn’t we at least have some minimal prohibitions in place that everyone can agree on?

First, we must ensure that things do not escalate into direct military clashes and warfare. If war does break out, the US may take over from there, or we might achieve victory alongside the US. But there won’t be a public around to “enjoy” that victory.

Second, we need to rein in the escalation of exercises and shows of military force. This is also a sort of prerequisite for the first prohibition.

The North should stop “testing” nuclear missiles and start staging exercises of its own. It’s an unwritten rule of behavior for every country’s military to treat exercises like warfare and to conduct warfare according to its exercises.

We also need to recognize when to make concessions to avoid getting drawn into a competition of pride and resolve — and concessions are for the stronger party to make.

Third, we should avoid allowing Japan to get pulled into the exercises. When South Korea and the US held joint naval exercises last September, they included a Japanese Asahi-class destroyer, while the drills on Feb. 22 included an Aegis-class destroyer. It is increasingly being taken for granted that these are trilateral exercises in which Japan takes part alongside the US.

If Japan takes part in joint exercises, that will signify military involvement on the peninsula beyond the level of a response to the North. That’s a matter to be decided after deliberation over the course of several administrations.

If I am to add two of my own personal wishes, I’d first like to see us continue our efforts to regain OPCON, which seem to be falling by the wayside.

One key reason the Moon Jae-in administration went ahead with joint exercises in the face of North Korea’s objections was to test whether the South met the conditions for an OPCON transfer. If they are going to do full-scale exercises anyway, it makes sense that they would address the issue in this way.

Second, I would stress that while they’re seeking to achieve security based on force, they also need to pursue some form of dialogue toward achieving peace. A hopeless wish, I know, but I don’t want to give up all hope yet.

By Moon Jang-ryul, former professor at Korea National Defense University

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]