[Analysis] The politics of the “kill chain”

Posted on : 2013-10-22 15:29 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
To be effective, kill chain policy must take place within context of autonomous defense and engagement with N. Korea
The concept of the Kill Chain. which is targeting steps for thetime sensitive target.
The concept of the Kill Chain. which is targeting steps for thetime sensitive target.

By Choi Jong-kun, Yonsei University professor

In a speech for Armed Forces Day on Oct. 1, President Park Geun-hye discussed keeping up a strong allied defense system with the United States. In particular, she said South Korea would be “quickly securing abilities to counter nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, including through the Kill-Chain system and the Korean Air and Missile Defense system” in order to “make sure that the North Korean regime recognizes that the nuclear arms and missiles to which it clings are no longer useful.”

On Oct. 11, Adm. Choi Yoon-hee said at his National Assembly confirmation hearing to become the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would “retaliate without hesitation” in the event of an enemy provocation.

“We would reduce not only the source of the provocation but any supporting and commanding forces to rubble,” Choi declared at the hearing. “If the enemy does decide to provoke us, we will make them bitterly regret their mistake.”

Together, Park and Choi’s remarks give a sense of how strongly committed South Korea’s leaders are to a deterrent against North Korea.

The greater sense of a need for national security clearly stems in large part from tensions that erupted on the peninsula after North Korea launched a long-range rocket last December and carried out a third nuclear test in February of this year. As those responsible for security, the administration, and the military in particular, has to consider the worst-case scenario. In this case, the scenario they need to prepare for is a nuclear-armed North Korea miniaturizing its weapons and loading them onto medium- to long-range missiles. The idea of a “kill chain” emerged as part of that plan.

 

What is a kill chain when used as a deterrent?  

A kill chain is a preemptive strike system that targets North Korean missiles before they are launched. More specifically, it is a process by which the military uses its various intelligence assets to detect, track, and carry out a precision strike on a target. It is also meant as a military deterrent against North Korea - sending the message that South Korea’s armed forces are willing to take preventive action by attacking the expected source of a nuclear missile launch if it judges one to be imminent.

Obviously, most South Koreans hope the worst-case scenario never comes to pass. The idea of a more flexible policy approach with Pyongyang may be an extension of that hope. But if we consider that the goal of any North Korea policy, whether it is based on engagement or prepare, is to not permit provocations from Pyongyang, then the kill chain strategy is clearly a significant step.

It is also one that needs to be scrutinized like any security strategy - especially when it is being paid for with taxpayer money. In other words, there needs to be an objective consideration as to whether the kill chain is realistic, whether it can actually stop North Korean provocations before they start, and whether it will improve the country’s security posture.

The idea of “deterrence” needs to be considered before any discussion of a kill chains’ effectiveness. The word “deter” includes senses of both prevention and punishment. A deterrence strategy involves more than just defending the country against an enemy attack; it is an active concept, a commitment to carrying out an even more damaging counterattack. In addition to connoting the ability to defend and punish, the term “deterrence” also carries the sense of flattening anyone who dares attack first.

There is an irony to all this: a country’s deterrent is, in the final analysis, based on how closely the two sides think alike. In other words, a deterrent is only effective if the other side shares the same value system. To put it simply, it has to value its territory and sovereignty, and its citizens’ lives and property, as much as we do our own. This is the only way it can recognize the signal and shy away from any provocations. The psychological factor behind the deterrent is the fear that an attack could lead to retaliation that will destroy everything you hold dear. In short, a deterrent is determined by a number of different factors: military capabilities, the willingness to punish provocations, and the other side’s rational calculations.

 

Is S. Korea even capable of carrying out detection and strike?

The question then, is whether South Korea is capable of employing the kill chain strategy to beef up its security. The current “vision for national defense” has six components to a successful kill chain. First, intelligence authorities have to be able to detect signs of a North Korean attack within one minute of launch. Second, they need intelligence - also within one minute - on where and how the attack will take place. Third, the top military leader has to be able to order a preemptive strike within three minutes. Fourth, the strike has to be carried out before North Korea carries out its own. Fifth, authorities have to be able to rate the success of the strike - that is, whether it did in fact knock out the source of the provocation. And finally, they have to be able to respond to an enemy counterstrike.

What are the South Korean military’s current detection and strike capabilities? Here the holes are numerous. It has no military satellites. It is no high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle. Indeed, it has little more that can be put to military use than the Arirang-5 multi-purpose satellite, the Geumgang and Baekdu reconnaissance aircraft (which are capable of recording and listening in on front-line areas), and the radar on the navy’s Aegis vessels. In short, there is little to nothing it can detect on its own. It simply does not have enough eyes to observe North Korea. Some have blamed this on an overdependence on US intelligence. But even if the Ministry of National Defense were able to share all military intelligence with the US in real time, there are still very basic questions as to whether it could detect all of North Korea’s major attack installations and sensitive targets within one minute. One of the most well-known failures came last winter, when military authorities in South Korea and the US were unable to detect signs of the launch of North Korea’s 30-meter-tall Unha-3 rocket, which had been left exposed at its launch site in Tongchang for several days. The focus now is on how - and if - South Korea’s military will be able to detect strategic installations throughout North Korea.

Even if signs of a nuclear strike can be detected within one minute, and a target can be set, another problem remains. The only conceivable scenarios where North Korea might use a nuclear weapon on South Korea would be a quasi-state-of-war, or a situation where local war has erupted, or is about to erupt, in the border regions. In such cases, the president would have to exercise his or her authority to order a preemptive strike. This is the key phase for the kill chain: the crucial moment in a military emergency that calls for a political determination from the president - the point when the powers invested in the leader are invoked. The question that arises, then, is whether the South Korean president would even be able to issue such an order alone under exigent circumstances.

 

The crucial OPCON variable  

South Korea does not hold wartime operational control (OPCON) on its own. Even if it possessed physical kill chain capabilities, the president would still need to discuss the matter within the Combined Forces Command framework before issuing the order to strike. This creates a contradiction between the kill chain on one hand, and the main issue of the moment - postponement of the OPCON transfer - on the other. Time and money would be enough to establish the physical capabilities for a kill chain. But if the decision is made to push back the transfer - which would give South Korea the authority to make its own decision on whether to strike the source of a North Korean attack at a time of severe threat - this raises the question of whether Seoul is actually committed to the kill chain. The North Korea deterrent is only complete when OPCON is transferred to South Korea as scheduled and Seoul is fully committed to carrying it out.

Imagine the following scenario: signs of an imminent North Korean attack have been detected, and the President has exercised her authority to order an independent strike. At the moment, South Korea’s military possesses surface-to-surface cruise missiles (the Hyeonmu-3), surface-to-surface ballistic missiles (Hyeonmu-1 and Hyeonmu-2), ship-to-ground missiles (the Haesong-2), and submarine-launched missiles (the Haesong-3). But most experts question the accuracy of this “top-of-the-line weaponry.” Frequent malfunctioning has seriously hurt the credibility of the South Korean-developed weapon system. And the current missile system is incapable of striking the source of North Korean provocations from deep in or behind mountains or inside tunnels.

The answer to the problem is to send in the fighter jets. The most effective strike weapon the Air Force possesses is the Slam-ER, with a range of 270 km. But even if it scrambles its top-of-the-line F-15K fighters to launch the Slam-ER from south of the armistice line, it would still be unable to strike targets in North Hamgyong Province. The military had hoped to address this shortcoming by purchasing the long-range JASSM joint air-to-surface missile, but the US government nixed the sale. The next option would be to purchase German-made Taurus missiles, but this creates a technical problem, since they would have to be placed on US-built fighters. Once again, South Korea is learning a lesson in the importance - and elusiveness - of autonomy over its own defense.

Even if it is strongly committed to deterring North Korean provocations, this commitment is just rhetoric unless the military can back it up with capability. The administration of President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-08) - the same one that conservatives blasted as “North Korea-friendly leftists” - raised the defense budget by an average of 8.8% annually over its five-year term. Indeed, the only real deterrent assets the South Korean military currently possesses, including the F-15K, the Peace Eye early warning aircraft, and the Navy’s Aegis-equipped vessels, were all acquired during the Roh administration.

The administration of Roh’s successor, Lee Myung-bak (2008-13), harped on the importance of national security at every opportunity. So how did it fare? Over five years, the defense budget was raised by an annual average of just 5.3%. Late in the Roh administration, the decision was made to purchase the Global Hawk, a high-altitude UAV that would be an important asset in detecting and setting targets in North Korea. The plans quickly vanished when Lee questioned why such an expensive purchase was being made when the US would provide its assistance anyway. Now South Korea finds itself having to purchase an older Global Hawk model at a price that is nearly four times higher.

 

Commitment to deterring North Korea 

President Park Geun-hye may have described the kill chain and Korean Air and Missile Defense system as the linchpins of the North Korea deterrent, but her defense budget raises questions about Seoul’s commitment to the first of them. Defense spending for 2014 is set to rise by just 4.1%. The kill chain budget was slashed from 1.116 trillion won (US$1.05 billion) to 999.7 billion won (US$941.7 billion) - a difference of about US$110 million. Particularly deep cuts were made to medium- and long-range air-to-surface guided missiles, satellite tracking systems, and improvements to the Hyeonmu missiles. The Park administration did say it planned to hasten introduction of the kill chain, moving it up from the mid-2020s to the early part of the decade. But the planned budget raises serious questions about feasibility. Supposing the OPCON transfer is delayed to reflect the security environment - with all the concessions that entails - the next question is how all the hammering on the kill chain pledge will look to Pyongyang when the defense budget is no longer increasing.

It has been said that there are no conservatives or progressives when it comes to South Korea’s security. This is true enough, but consideration should be given to the fact that it is the country’s autonomy over defense that underpins the North Korea deterrent, and that this cornerstone itself depends upon a stronger, more practical deterrent. In that sense, the Park administration’s first defense budget comes up somewhat short.

A final fact to consider is that the final target, North Korea, is needed to complete the kill chain. That is, Pyongyang has to be convinced of Seoul’s commitment to its deterrent. Even if South Korea has perfect capabilities and a strong commitment to using them, the deterrent effect will be only minor if North Korea is not aware of it. This raises the question of just how Seoul can convince Pyongyang that it means business. The way to do that is to give concrete proof of South Korean autonomy, Seoul’s ability to defend itself. And for that to happen, the OPCON transfer needs to take place on schedule. It would send a clear message to Pyongyang to any provocations would result in resolute retaliation. Another step that needs to be taken is the development of more balanced armed forces: establishing independent North Korean surveillance capabilities and improving the combat aviation skills to project military power at medium and long ranges.

And through all of this, there is one other thing South Korea should not lose sight of: the need for dialogue. It definitely needs to send Pyongyang the message that it will not accept provocations and is willing to punish them. But if there are no provocations, then it should come up with a more flexible North Korea policy. This means assuring Pyongyang that a stable security environment on the peninsula and a relationship of reciprocity will help the North achieve its economic recovery.

This sort of environment is needed for the kill chain deterrent to have a positive effect in promoting peace and stability. The talk about “striking sources of provocation” rings hollow when South Korea’s capabilities and commitment are in question, as they are right now. Indeed, the belligerence may have the unintended consequence of fanning concerns about the security situation. It is a message South Korea’s leaders should take to heart: the kill chain starts with stronger military capabilities, and it won’t be complete without a commitment to autonomous defense and engagement with Pyongyang.

 

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

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