hankyoreh

John Feffer

Zhu Feng, a Chinese scholar of international relations, recently had his visa revoked as he was leaving Los Angeles to return to China. According to the State Department, the Trump administration is cracking down on scholars suspected of gathering intelligence for the Chinese government. The United States is also retaliating against China for its refusal to grant visas to certain American scholars over the years.

I’ve worked with Zhu Feng over the years. He is a well-respected political scientist who appears at numerous international conferences as one of the best analysts of Chinese policy. His writing is free of cant, and he communicates in excellent English – which makes him an invaluable source of information about China. The notion that he is a spy is nonsense. He doesn’t have access to intellectual property or sensitive information.

As retaliation for China’s diplomatic stone-walling, Zhu Feng’s visa cancellation is the latest self-defeating act of the Trump administration in the escalating conflict with China. Beijing has indeed restricted access to the country – but most often to scholars it suspects of being “anti-China” in some way. For instance, it recently made it impossible for a Trump advisor, Michael Pillsbury, to attend a conference in China.

By contrast, the United States is cutting off access to scholars, like Zhu Feng, who are perhaps most eager to see an improvement in U.S.-China relations. Last year, the Trump administration imposed new visa restrictions on Chinese students who want to pursue their studies in the United States. The administration has even considered banning Chinese students altogether (there are 340,000 Chinese students currently at U.S. universities). These students and scholars are the best hope for ensuring a cooperative future for the United States and China.

Most of the headlines on U.S.-China affairs focus on the brewing trade war. The United States has slapped tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods and has threatened to go after $267 billion more. China has retaliated with tariffs on $110 billion of U.S. goods. This trade war has already harmed specific sectors – soybeans, steel – and the two countries risk dragging the global economy into recession.

Currently in a truce, both sides have pledged to find an exit to this trade impasse. Some kind of deal is expected next month.

But this trade conflict is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the disagreements between Washington and Beijing. In addition to the visa imbroglio, the two countries are going head to head on technology, human rights, and international law. They are involved in a woefully expensive arms race that could spark a hot war across the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea. They find themselves on opposite sides of a number of other international conflicts, from South Asia to Venezuela. They are competing for influence and resources throughout Africa and Latin America. And they come down very differently on critical global issues such as climate change.

The international order has depended on U.S.-China cooperation for much of the post-Cold War period. This has been, for the most part, a marriage of convenience between two countries with different ideological outlooks but many overlapping interests. But now it looks as though Beijing and Washington are preparing for a divorce. Any agreement on trade would just be the calm before a future storm.

The growing tensions between these two superpowers put middle powers like South Korea in a very difficult position. China is South Korea’s leading trading partner, but South Korea also is tied to the United States in a military alliance. Previous South Korean leaders, notably Roh Moo-Hyun, encountered considerable resistance from Washington when attempting to chart a more nuanced approach to Beijing.

President Moon Jae-in has generally avoided this particular conundrum. Early in his term, he negotiated an agreement that satisfied China’s objections over the THAAD missile defense system the United States was installing in South Korea. And Moon has developed a good working relationship with Donald Trump, at least as it pertains to North Korea.

The U.S.-China trade conflict affects South Korean manufacturing, particularly the semiconductors that end up in Chinese products bound for the U.S. market. Indeed, South Korean exports suffered a significant drop in the first part of this year, the worst since 2016. Some South Korean firms are also using the current conflict as a good time to relocate their manufacturing from China to other places, like Vietnam.

But trade is only part of the problem. In response to a perceived military threat from China, the United States is pouring money into big-ticket military items like fighter jets. But the Trump administration is also trying to shift the costs of the U.S. military presence to its Asian allies. Under the latest deal, signed earlier this year, Seoul agreed to an 8.2 percent increase in cost-sharing with Washington. But the agreement is only for one year. Expect the Trump administration to play hardball next year as well.

Then there’s the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, China’s major infrastructure development project for the Asian region and beyond. Last year, Japan signed on to the ambitious program, pledging to work with China on building projects in Southeast Asia. Even Italy has joined hands with China on OBOR, providing access to ports like Genoa and Trieste.

Moon Jae-in has expressed enthusiasm for linking South Korea closer to OBOR. For one thing, it would facilitate financing for major inter-Korean projects, like the rebuilding of the train lines connecting North and South.

But the United States has remained cool to China’s global economic ambitions. So, if divorce becomes more likely, South Korea might have to choose between Beijing and Washington. The truth is, the South Korean military is strong enough to survive without U.S. assistance. But the South Korean economy can’t survive without China.

There are no upsides for South Korea if the United States and China drift apart. The reunification of the peninsula – and so much more in Northeast Asia – depends on at least cordial relations between Washington and Beijing.

The Moon administration has already spent considerable capital trying to mediate between the United States and North Korea. It’s perhaps too much to ask the diplomats in Seoul to add another mediation to their full agendas. But South Korea has too much invested in U.S.-China détente to watch from the sidelines.

By John Feffer, director of Foreign Policy In Focus

The views presented in this column are the writer’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of The Hankyoreh.

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