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A South Korean guard post in the DMZ flies the UN and South Korean flags. (South Korean Army Headquarters website)

By Kim Yeon-chul, former minister of unification and current professor at Inje University

The role of the UN Command (UNC) in Korea has been in flux. The US wants to turn it into a multilateral security framework with the aim of containing China. Germany recently joined as its 18th member, and the door appears to be opening for Japan to participate — which is a very worrying prospect.

At this point, I have to ask the question: What is the UNC’s reason for existing? The answer is to manage the armistice system.

The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has turned back into a militarized zone. Propaganda leaflets and North Korean trash balloons are floating through the skies, and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has resumed propaganda broadcasts.

All of these are violations of the Armistice Agreement. What has the UNC done amid this breakdown in the armistice system?

Every time the UNC has exercised its authority over access to the DMZ, the grounds it has cited have been related to “security.”

When it prevented a German government delegation from visiting a checkpoint in Goseong, Gangwon Province, in June 2019, it cited “security reasons” as its basis for doing so. In August 2019, the South Korean minister of unification attempted to visit the community of Daeseong, where South Koreans currently reside, but the reporters traveling with him were denied access — again for “security” reasons.

“Security” was also the reason cited for calling then-presidential candidate Yoon’s 2021 visit to the DMZ in military uniform a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

Given the authority the UNC has wielded in the name of “security,” it ought to be taking responsibility when that security is compromised. Its burden of responsibility is as great as its powers. After all, didn’t the UNC itself put certain regulations in place?

The UNC commander’s approval is required to bring weapons into the DMZ. What has the UNC done in the face of the Yoon administration’s preemptive armament — which is not even an after-the-fact response to the North Korean military arming itself? By sitting by as the DMZ becomes remilitarized, the UNC has essentially negated its own reason for being.

What about the propaganda leaflets and trash balloons? Obviously, the balloons laden with trash that North Korea has been sending are in violation of the Armistice Agreement. The same is true for the propaganda leaflets sent by the South.

The Constitutional Court stated the position that while it is possible to ban the scattering of these leaflets under existing laws, the enactment of new legislation would constitute excessive prohibition. The Yoon administration could prevent the leaflet launches through strict implementation of existing provisions such as Article 5-1 of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers or the Aviation Safety Act. Without the leaflet balloons, there would be no trash balloons.

While the South Korean government’s commitment to solving the problem is important, the UNC also bears responsibilities. The preamble to the Armistice Agreement prescribes the “complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force.” The UNC needs to lead by example and show its commitment to upholding the terms of that agreement.

There are also detailed UNC regulations barring flight activities in the DMZ. Explicit bans are in place on ultra-lightweight aviation devices such as drones, large balloons, and model airplanes.

Why is the UNC not taking issue with the violations of regulations banning flight activities? Are there any other examples of violations besides the ones by the groups launching the leaflet balloons? Not only that, but these violations have been happening repeatedly.

What about the loudspeaker broadcasts to North Korea? In 2017, the UNC created regulations requiring the commander’s approval for the resumption of any replacement, addition, repair, or operation activities in settings where loudspeakers were installed. Broadcasting was also only allowed in response to North Korean propaganda broadcasts to the South, and it was made contingent on approval by the UNC commander.

The South Korean Ministry of National Defense’s resumption of loudspeaker broadcasts is in clear violation of UNC regulations. The command did the right thing by expressing its concerns about the broadcasts, but it is difficult to understand it doing nothing about the violations.

Some might argue that the UNC is obliged to take the South Korean government’s position into account. Even in that case, it needs to show responsibility that is at least commensurate with its powers. If it wishes to avoid taking responsibility, it obviously ought to relinquish its powers.

The scattering of leaflets and broadcasting of propaganda toward North Korea are in violation of the Armistice Agreement and in clear contravention of UN Command regulations. A convincing case cannot be made for criticizing only the North’s violations of the Armistice Agreement without taking issue with the South’s.

The reason the US initiated discussions on a stronger role for the UNC in 2014 is that it wanted to create a multilateral security framework under its own leadership for after the return of operational control (OPCON) powers to South Korea.

These days, discussions on the OPCON transfer are nowhere in sight, and the only progress happening has had to do with the UNC’s changing role.

For the sake of a sustainable South Korea-US alliance, there needs to be a balance of interests between the two sides. The US is trying to alter the UNC’s role in order to pursue its Indo-Pacific strategy while dividing up the costs of the Korean Peninsula’s security. South Korea has the inherent responsibility of preserving and creating peace on the peninsula.

If the focus is solely on strengthening the UNC’s role while neglecting its responsibilities for managing the armistice, that balance of interest becomes unsustainable, and it becomes something unlikely to win the support of a majority of South Koreans.

Military sovereignty is important. For sovereignty to take root firmly, there needs to be some flexibility in the combined forces and multilateral cooperation.

Many people content themselves with the fact that it is the US and not the Yoon administration that holds wartime operation control powers. But we must not forget that in the long term, military sovereignty is a national foundation that cannot be forsaken. 

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