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US President Joe Biden shakes hands with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol at their summit on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington, DC, on July 11, 2024. (Yonhap)

By Kwon Hyuk-chul, inter-Korean affairs and unification editor

“Same bed, different dreams.” The phrase implies that while two parties may appear to be acting as one, they are actually thinking differently. Recently, the attitudes of South Korea and the United States regarding extended deterrence have been a clear example of this.

On July 16, President Yoon Suk-yeol, while presiding over a Cabinet meeting, stated, “Through the ROK-US Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula, an integrated extended deterrence system in which both South Korea and the US work together has finally been securely established, and the ROK-US alliance has been firmly elevated to a truly nuclear-based alliance.” These joint guidelines were adopted by the leaders of South Korea and the US during their July 11 summit in Washington, DC. 

Yoon, in reference to the guidelines, stated, “By specially assigning missions to US nuclear assets to the Korean Peninsula both in wartime and peacetime, we have now established a posture that allows us to swiftly and effectively respond to any type of North Korean nuclear threat.”

Kim Tae-hyo, the first deputy director of the National Security Office, also noted that this was “the first time it has been put into writing that US nuclear assets will be assigned missions for deterring and responding to North Korean nuclear threats.” A senior official from the presidential office explained, “Through the constant deployment and operation of the US nuclear triad — nuclear-armed submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers — extended deterrence will operate as an integrated system 24 hours a day.”

However, the US perspective is quite different. Vipin Narang, the acting assistant secretary of defense for space policy, stated in an interview with Voice of America (VOA) on July 17 that the US does not assign specific weapons to specific missions or targets. Narang, the person responsible for operations related to extended deterrence on the US side, signed the joint guidelines together with Cho Chang-rae, Korea’s deputy defense minister for policy.

When asked if Yoon’s statement about assigning specific missions to US nuclear assets for the Korean Peninsula both in wartime and peacetime meant, for example, designating specific US strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to monitor only the Korean Peninsula, Narang responded, “No.” He clarified, “I want to be very clear. What that means, essentially, is we commit to having nuclear forces available in all contingencies in the event of a nuclear or strategic attack against South Korea. In our system, we don’t assign specific weapons to specific missions or targets. If you pre-assign anything, then you’re reducing flexibility.”

South Korea and the US also differ in their views on the “integrated extended deterrence system in which both South Korea and the US work together.” Kim Tae-hyo explained, “While extended deterrence was previously determined and provided by the US, it has now evolved to include Korean organizations, personnel, and assets for nuclear operations on the Korean Peninsula alongside the US.” The Ministry of National Defense likewise stated, “Now, South Korea will discuss joint planning and execution of nuclear and conventional integration as an equal partner with the US.”

On the US side, following the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting in June, Narang had said that the joint guidelines document “institutionalizes the NCG as an enduring bilateral body that will strengthen cooperation between the US and ROK and our extended deterrence as equal partners.” However, regarding his statement about South Korea being an “equal partner,” Narang clarified, “Only the United States president can authorize the use and employment of US nuclear weapons,” adding, “When I say ‘equal partners,’ what we have done is improved our ability to coordinate [Korea’s] conventional support [. . .] for US nuclear operations that involve the ROK.” As examples of such conventional support, he pointed to the South Korean Air Force escorting or refueling US bombers conducting nuclear strikes.

When the VOA reporter asked if this meant that Korea would have institutionalized input during the planning and execution stages, Narang reemphasized that while Seoul would have the ability to provide input into the process, there would be “the caveat that the actual employment decision of nuclear weapons resides only with the United States president.” In other words, following the South Korean interpretation of integrated extended deterrence as “nuclear sharing” involving the joint operation of US nuclear weapons, Narang appeared on VOA to essentially tell Korea not to overstep its bounds. 

To summarize Narang’s interview bluntly, the US is saying that “US nuclear weapons belong to the US. South Korea merely plays a supporting role, so wake up from this midsummer night’s dream.”

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]