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On July 19, 2000, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin during their meeting in Pyongyang. (courtesy of the Kremlin)

Which foreign head of state has visited Pyongyang the most since the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established on Sept. 9, 1948? It’s no other than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin was the first leader in Russian history — including its history as the Soviet Union — to visit Pyongyang in July 2000 and visited again this June. Comparing Putin’s two trips, which have a 24-year gap in between, makes us realize how much the political situation on the Korean Peninsula has changed.
 
While it was not as prominent as the conflict today, the US and Russia were also embroiled in strategic friction in 2000. The Bill Clinton administration was receiving great pressure from the Republican Party and the military-industrial complex to push forward with a national missile defense system. For that to happen, adjustments had to be made to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ratified between the US and the Soviet Union in 1972, as the treaty banned the creation of a missile defense system. Clinton needed Putin’s approval to tweak the treaty.
 
However, Putin declined to give his approval as he believed that the missile defense system would disrupt the strategic balance between the US and Russia as well as lead to NATO further extending its influence at a time when it was already expanding. This made the missile defense issue one of the hot potatoes of international politics in the early 2000s.
 
It is also necessary to see how major member states of NATO reacted to the situation. Following a turbulent period starting from the late 1990s, in which NATO’s expansion and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 had guided the relationship between NATO and Russia to reach a fork in the road, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 ensured that the relationship crossed a bridge of no return.
 
Identifying Russia as a common enemy, the US and European NATO members have shown a strong sense of unity in pursuit of weakening Russia, while Russia has become the poster child for anti-American and anti-Western sentiment.
 
However, the political circumstances surrounding 2000 were drastically different. Javier Solana, the former EU foreign policy chief, took a swipe at the US, saying that the international community would be “outraged” if the US continued to pursue such a missile defense system, saying that such a decision would only add to impressions of America as an “arrogant superpower.”

Joschka Fischer, the foreign minister of Germany at the time, also saw the matter as a key factor that could bring about a clash between the US and Russia, and thus said the decision would have major implications for the international community. The government of France also said it saw no need for a missile defense system, and many countries in the European Union agreed. Canada also agreed with such a position.
 
The two Koreas are also very different. Today, the war in Ukraine is being used by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in Seoul to promote pro-US sentiment under the guise of solidarity based on shared values, while the Kim Jong-un regime is using it to promote anti-US sentiment based on the claims of multi-polarization of the international order. North and South, the two countries on the farthest eastern side of Eurasia are currently considered the major suppliers of arms to a war being fought on the other side of the continent.
 
In 2000, the situation could not have been any more different. Kim Dae-jung’s administration in the South actively mediated and facilitated Choson’s — as North Korea refers to itself — relations with the US, aiming to dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula, and organized the first-ever inter-Korean summit. Kim Jong-il’s regime also engaged in dialogue with the US and South Korea, which made many hope that this auspicious cycle would bring an end to more than 50 years of hostile US-North Korea relations.
 
But there was a catch: the missile defense system. While the US did support Kim Dae-jung’s Korean Peninsula peace process, it also wanted to use South Korea as part of its missile defense system and pointed to North Korea as a pretext.
 
The US considered South Korea, which was closest to North Korea, China and Russia, to be the most optimal ally for the missile defense system. Since the US could not outwardly proclaim that China or Russia were threats that called for the establishment of a missile defense system, the theory stating North Korea was a threat proved very useful. However, this argument was incompatible with the rest of their policies, as can be seen by the fact that Kim Dae-jung rejected the US request to join the missile defense system and accelerated the peace process.
 
That was the exact moment when Putin visited Pyongyang. The timing was impeccable. When Clinton visited Moscow in June 2000, Putin rebuffed Clinton’s request to amend the ABM treaty. The inter-Korean summit that took place in mid-June of that year significantly weakened the validity of the narratives labeling Pyongyang as a threat. After that, the Russian government announced Putin would be setting off on a tour of Asia.

Between July 17 and 19, Putin visited Beijing and held a summit with then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin, which was followed by the issuance of a joint statement opposing the US’ missile defense system. A G8 summit was scheduled to take place in Okinawa on July 21 and 23, and the ABM treaty and missile defense would be among the top agenda items at that meeting, which Putin was also scheduled to attend.

Prior to traveling to Okinawa, Putin visited Pyongyang and met with Kim Jong-il.

In a press conference after the summit, Putin shared remarks made by Kim, who reportedly said he was willing to abandon long-range missile development if other countries would support Choson with its launching of satellites.

The foreign press described this as Putin taking “immediate advantage” of an opportunity to put a stop to the US missile defense plans. The US was using the North Korean missile threat as an excuse to build up its missile defense, and here were Kim and Putin taking the wind out of those sails.

The emboldened Putin went on to use the G8 as a platform for defending the ABM treaty and opposing missile defense. As mentioned previously, several US allies took Russia’s side on the matter.

As a result, the final G8 communiqué — which the US also agreed to — included a provision for “preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.”

The Clinton administration now found itself in a bind. Around a month later, it announced that it was putting its missile defense on hold, and it began making efforts in earnest to a senior-level meeting with Pyongyang. This led to the two sides’ respective seconds-in-command making reciprocal visits to Washington and Pyongyang, while Clinton promised to pay his own visit to the country.

As a Choson-US summit appeared more likely to follow on the heels of the inter-Korean summit, it looked as though the “post-Cold War era” was finally arriving on the lonely Cold War island that was the Korean Peninsula.

But all this evaporated that November when the US presidential election went to George W. Bush, a Republican who staked everything on missile defense. The president-elect’s camp opposed Clinton’s visit, which it said could cause problems for missile defense; shortly after taking office, it dismissed the promise of a summit with North Korea and used the country’s missile threat as a basis for declaring the establishment of a missile defense system.

The matter was the subject of seething critical opinion internationally when the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred, and the Bush administration used them as an excuse to back out of the ABM treaty.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) shakes hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after the two leaders signed a pact for a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024. (TASS/Yonhap)

Over two decades later, the international political situation is quite different, the Korean Peninsula included. Putin’s first visit to Pyongyang in 24 years was symbolic of this.

When he visited in 2000, part of his aim was to mediate the relationship between Pyongyang and Washington, which was in a rough situation due to the missile issue. He also offered a compromise to the two sides, suggesting that Russia could launch Choson’s satellite as a proxy.

In contrast, his recent visit was aimed squarely at taking advantage of the current antagonism between Choson and the US. He shifted nuclear non-proliferation — traditionally an area of emphasis for Moscow — to the back burner, while opting to effectively acknowledge Choson’s nuclear capabilities and neutralize the UN’s sanctions against it.

An especially noteworthy development here was his announcement of plans to pursue a comprehensive strategic partnership in opposition to the US and West, while restoring the alliance that previously existed between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Perspectives on the “new Cold War” have shifted dramatically as a result. During the early 2000s, few people were voicing concerns about a Cold War revival. Some did voice concerns that Washington’s abandonment of the ABM treaty and pursuit of missile defense could disrupt the strategic balance and spark a nuclear arms race.

In the years since then, the “new Cold War” perspective has become a widely held stance. The fears held by a minority two decades ago have turned into a reality, and the strategic race between the US and China has heated up, along with the confrontation between NATO and Russia over Ukraine.

Military ties between South Korea, the US, and Japan — which did not even exist during the old Cold War era — have been heading for the level of a de facto alliance, while Choson, China and Russia are showing signs of solidarity in response.

As the strengthening of NATO and Indo-Pacific strategies have come together to raise the specter of a vast military network surrounding Choson, China, and Russia, Moscow has pushed back by announcing plans to create an equal and indivisible security framework in Eurasia.

The new Cold War system reflects the ability to resolve structures from the old Cold War on the Korean Peninsula. For the US, the end of its Cold War with the Soviet Union around 1990 led both to victory celebrations and to a sense of hollowness after the loss of its chief foe.

Flushed with triumph, the US adopted a dramatically different attitude. It backed out of its pledge not to expand NATO and continued expanding eastward. The fixation on the “North Korea threat” was a way of assuaging those hollow feelings.

Missile defense has consistently been central to this. The “North Korea threat” has been trotted out over and over: when the Bush administration pulled out of the ABM treaty, when the Barack Obama administration pursued its “rebalance to Asia” strategy, when the Donald Trump administration embarked on major changes to nuclear strategy, and when South Korea, the US and Japan turned missile defense into a vital link in strengthening their military ties.

Meanwhile, Choson has remained a victim of the old Cold War even after that conflict ostensibly ended between the US and Soviet Union. Its attempts to reach out to the US and Japan and escape its international isolation have been repeatedly rebuffed.

The nuclear weapon and missile cards were things that Pyongyang resorted to in the hopes of drawing the attention of the imperial US and getting it to negotiate; instead, they boomeranged back in the form of stiffer economic sanctions. Even China and Russia — which had been its allies during the Cold War era — joined in those sanctions.

Meanwhile, the gap in national power between South and North continued to widen, leaving the latter in the position of having to worry about being absorbed into its neighbor.

But somewhere on the way, Choson went from an “impoverished and isolated nation attempting to develop nuclear capabilities” to a “nuclear state escaping from its impoverishment and isolation.”

Its nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced to the point where they could strike the continental US. Indeed, it would not be overstating things to call Choson a “beneficiary” of the new Cold War.

During the old Cold War era, China and Russia opposed Choson’s nuclear armament and joined in the sanctions against it. But as the specter of the new Cold War becomes clearer, those countries are now placing the balance of power and a multipolar global order ahead of nuclear non-proliferation.

As a result, the advancement of Choson’s nuclear and missile capabilities has been joined by a collapse in the sanctions framework against it and by China and Russia’s increasing acceptance of those capabilities. This is why the Kim Jong-un regime is feeling increasingly confident about having already laid the groundwork for economic advancement through self-regeneration, self-sufficiency, and a parallel course of nuclear and economic development.

So where does this leave South Korea?

During the old Cold War days on the peninsula, Seoul was able to broaden its economic and diplomatic horizons through diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, all with a firm alliance in place with the US.

But the new Cold War is a different story. Seoul’s ties with Moscow are in the worst state of their history, while trade relations with China have gone from an all-time surplus to an all-time deficit.

The US is busy using a mixture of pressure and coaxing to swallow up advanced sectors such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, and batteries. Meanwhile, Japan is also reemerging as a strong competitor in these fields.

The prospects for a Korean Peninsula economic community and northern expansions — which had been regarded as a “blue ocean” for the South Korean economy — have likewise evaporated. While Korea has made its way to a top-five military power in the world and its alliance with the US is supposedly stronger than ever — as is military cooperation with the US and Japan — still, there’s no end to the security anxieties. 

That’s why we need to know our enemy and to know ourselves. Even if the North were to rise and the South to fall, there would still be a major disparity in national power. While Choson’s treaties with China and Russia are still mostly all paper tigers, South Korea’s alliance with the US and triangular alliance with the US and Japan have real and material force, as demonstrated by US troop stationing and joint exercises. But if, like the Yoon administration, we take this as the basis for triumphalism, South Korea will be left saddled with the paradoxes of the old Cold War and the risks of the new one. 

It’s time to let go of the refrain of “peace by strength alone” and seek the wisdom of peaceful coexistence, while exercising restraint when it comes to flaunting the South’s superior strength. 

By Cheong Wook-sik, director of the Hankyoreh Peace Institute and director of the Peace Network

Editor’s note: For more on why the author uses “Choson” to refer to North Korea, see his column: ‘Choson’: Is it time we start referring to N. Korea in its own terms?

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