Wide-ranging incompetence and cover-ups took place night of Cheonan sinking, audit reveals

Posted on : 2010-06-11 12:12 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29 KST
A number of observers believe that the announcement of audit results only presented an abbreviated version of the findings
 April 30.
 
April 30.  

It has come to light that Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lee Sang-eui was heavily intoxicated on the night of March 26 when the sinking of the Cheonan took place. This represented an effective surrender of his command responsibilities. It was also revealed that military authorities willfully revised the time of the incident in order to avoid criticisms about an improper early response and edited only a portion of its thermal optical device (TOD) videos for disclosure to the media in order to justify the erroneous announcement of the time.

The Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) released an interim announcement Thursday on the findings of its inspection of the response to the sinking of the Cheonan.

“A number of problem areas were found in the response of the Defense Ministry and the ministry in terms of battle prevention and readiness posture, situating reporting and transmission, crisis response measures, and management of military secrecy,” said BAI. “We have also directed the Defense Ministry to take appropriate measures such as disciplinary action on 25 individuals in that ministry and the main military command, including Lee Sang-eui.”

BAI held a press conference Thursday to announce the audit results.

“Both command responsibility and personal responsibility are factors in the disciplinary measures Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lee Sang-eui is currently facing,” said Park Si-jong, head of the BAI’s Government Administration and National Security Audit Bureau.

Park refused to disclose the extent of Lee’s personal responsibility, saying it would be “inappropriate” to do so, leading observers to contend that the announcement only presented an abbreviated version of the findings. BAI also did not disclose the names or positions of the remaining 24 individuals for whom disciplinary action was requested. Sources indicate that they include Naval Operations Commander Park Jung-hwa, Joint Operation Center Command Hwang Jung-seon, Defense Intelligence Agency director Hwang Won-dong, Second Fleet Commander Kim Dong-sik, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Staff Department head Kim Hak-ju.

With regard to Lee Sang-eui’s personal responsibility, a number of military sources reported that following a military leaders’ forum at the Gyeryongdae compound the day of the Cheonan’s sinking, he traveled to Seoul by KTX in a heavily inebriated state following a group dinner.

The sources said that he reportedly arrived at the Defense Ministry command control room around 10:42 p.m. that evening and, after spending about ten minutes attending a situation assessment meeting supervised by the ministry, effectively abandoned his duties and fell asleep.

It has also been reported that President Lee Myung-bak became furious after receiving a report on the BAI’s findings, including Lee Sang-eui’s intoxication, and ordered that personnel measures be taken.

The account from the Defense Ministry to date has been that after Defense Minister Kim Tae-young left the ministry to attend a meeting of national security-related ministers at the Cheong Wa Dae (the presidential office in South Korea or Blue House), Lee Sang-eui took command, presiding over a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 11:10 p.m. until 1:45 a.m. that night.

Additionally, the BAI inspection showed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff received notification from Naval Operations Command (NOC) that the time of the incident was 9:15 p.m., but revised the time to 9:45 p.m. when reporting it to Kim. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also received a report from the NOC about the possibility of the incident having resulting from an external shock, based on factors such the sound of an explosion, but omitted this from its report to their superiors.

“In altering the time of the incident, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were trying to avoid criticisms of an inadequate immediate response and lax alertness,” said Park Si-jong.

It was also found that the Defense Ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware that TOD video footage was recorded from 9:25:38 p.m. on the day of the sinking, but disclosed only an edited version with footage from after 9:35:08 p.m. “The military changed the time of the incident from 9:45 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. that night, but it concealed the extra footage because it would be difficult to stick with the previously announced time if it got out into the media,” said BAI.

In a document stating its position on BAI’s findings, the Defense Ministry said, “Based on these inspection findings, we will reflect thoroughly on our conventional practices to date and boldly improve problematic areas in order to improve the operational capacity of our military’s crisis management system.”

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]

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