hankyoreh

former Unification Minister

The only news I’m hearing in response to North Korea’s test launch of the Hwasong-15 ICBM is talk of sanctions. That has been the case with every North Korean provocation, but this time it’s especially bad. On top of that, the belief that sanctions can force the North to yield appears to be more widespread in South Korean society than ever before. Even though sanctions on the North have failed time and time again, South Korean society is pervaded with the hope that this time, things will be different. This is influenced by the US’s heavy-handed North Korean policy led by President Donald Trump.

So will sanctions be able to break North Korea’s determination to possess nuclear weapons this time? Take my word for it – this is wishful thinking. While I take no joy in flatly contradicting the direction in which government policy and the mood in society are leaning, playing along with American arguments or the social mood does not guarantee the national interest. And so I have no choice but to make a clear argument from an objective perspective.

Recently, the UN’s intense economic sanctions, spearheaded by the US, are inflicting more pain in the lives of North Koreans than before. But that pain does not mean that the sanctions are succeeding. Since long before, the suffering brought by sanctions has not convinced North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons – instead, it has driven the North to make even stronger weapons. Pyongyang’s launch of the Hwasong-15 is already raising questions about the effectiveness of the UN sanctions imposed this past September, which are regarded as having been extremely tough. In order to say that sanctions are effective, therefore, the suffering must be so great that North Korea takes a series of actions designed to give up its nuclear weapons.

People frequently regard North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s provocative behavior as being reckless and even crazy. But to borrow the words of US National Intelligence Director Dan Coats, Kim is not crazy – he’s only clinging to nuclear weapons and missiles to ensure his survival, and the survival of his regime. Under the cover of these provocations, Kim appears to have been calmly preparing for sanctions. The recent state of the North Korean economy supports this assessment.

Most significantly, Kim’s regime appears to have used agricultural reforms to achieve some degree of self-sufficiency in the food supply. In our conventional understanding, North Korea is symbolized by a shortage of food. This leads people to believe that toughening sanctions on the North will cause severe problems for its food supply. But over the past few years, North Korea’s food supply has gradually improved from before, though it has not imported a significant amount of food from the outside and though international aid has greatly decreased. This means that the North is starting to become self-sufficient in food production.

Recently, the percentage of industrial goods produced inside the country has rapidly increased, and its domestic market has been growing as well. The growth in the market has led to the rapid development of the domestic distribution sector as well. These changes in the North Korean economy mean that the North has bolstered its basic capacity to subsist even when its international economic activity shrinks drastically.

The limits of sanctions are also reflected by trade between North Korea and China. While the Trump administration insists that China holds the lifeline for the North Korean economy, China’s influence is in fact limited. The massive increase in trade between the two sides began in 2010. Bilateral trade doubled that year from the year before and increased more than 60% in 2011 as well (total volume of US$5.63 billion).

In the five years since then, however, bilateral trade has fluctuated because of sanctions on the North and basically remained stagnant (trade amounted to US$6.05 billion in 2016). Even while trade with China was stagnating, the North Korean economy underwent qualitative development and enjoyed major quantitative growth. This shows that reducing North Korea-China trade is unlikely to put a stranglehold on the North Korean economy.

Regardless of such trade figures, China’s sanctions against North Korea will inevitably be limited until a resolution can be found to its adversarial relationship with the US on the global stage. As long as the US is seeking a military alliance with South Korea and Japan, pursuing the Indo-Pacific Strategy and openly attempting to contain China, why would China do the US’s bidding by placing sanctions on North Korea that risk causing the regime’s collapse?

Lee Jong-seok

Though the limitations of sanctions are so clear, the South Korean government says that it will use sanctions and pressure to bring North Korea into dialogue. As long as North Korea is not yielding to the sanctions, such claims are little better than empty talk. While I understand that Seoul has few other options for finding a way out of this situation, this is not the answer. Now is the time to ask ourselves whether the statements about “firm pressure and sanctions” that are repeated after every North Korean provocation have ever served as more than a way for an angry public to vent. We also need to look for a new, more effective, alternative.

By Lee Jong-seok, former Unification Minister and Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]